A unified collection
organization, the Supplementary
Radio System (SRS), was created in 1966 as part of the unification of
the Canadian Armed Forces. The mission of the CFIOG/SRS is:
Recent updates (5 November 2001)
What is the Communications Security
Establishment?
Overview and Brief History
Budget
CF Information Operations Group
Policy, Operational and Administrative Control
Mandate
Monitoring of Canadians?
CSE/CFIOG Facilities
New Targets?
Recent Steps Toward Oversight
Strictly speaking, CSE is only part of Canada's SIGINT effort. A civilian agency of the Department of National Defence, CSE processes SIGINT, produces analyses, and disseminates reports to Canadian and allied consumer agencies. The actual collection of the SIGINT, however, is conducted by the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG), formerly known as the Supplementary Radio System (SRS), a component of the Canadian Armed Forces that operates under the direction of CSE.
CSE and the CFIOG in turn work in close co-operation with the giant American and British SIGINT agencies, the National Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), and a number of other SIGINT agencies in a global intelligence alliance known informally as the UKUSA community. These allies jointly operate the ECHELON surveillance system. CSE maintains permanent liaison officers at NSA HQ at Fort Meade, Maryland (CANSLO/W) and GCHQ in Cheltenham, UK (CANSLO/L). There are also NSA and GCHQ liaison officers at CSE HQ (SUSLO/O and BRLO, respectively). For more information about NSA, see the official NSA homepage or the much more informative Federation of American Scientists NSA homepage. For more information about GCHQ, see the official GCHQ homepage or the FAS unofficial GCHQ page. CSE, DSD, and GCSB also have official homepages.
In 1947, CBNRC began fulfilling the additional responsibility of serving as the Canadian government's communications-electronic security (COMSEC) agency. Prior to 1947, the government's encryption systems and keys had been provided by the United Kingdom. ``This arrangement,'' the History of CBNRC noted dryly, ``did not guarantee the privacy of Canadian government classified communications.''[3] CSE continues to bear both SIGINT and COMSEC responsibilities today (the latter responsibility now encompasses the somewhat broader category Information Technology Security (INFOSEC)). For more about CSE's INFOSEC mandate and current INFOSEC activities, see the official CSE homepage.
On 1 April 1975, CBNRC was transferred from the National Research Council to the Department of National Defence and its name changed to the Communications Security Establishment. At the time of its transfer, CBNRC/CSE had about 590 personnel. A major buildup during the period 1981-1990 left CSE at its current strength of about 900.[4]
An estimate of the number of personnel in each group within CSE is located on the 1995-96 CSE staff: Breakdown by groups page. Additional information about CSE's staff is located on the employee strength and authorized establishment page.
The history of cryptanalysis (codebreaking) at CSE. More about CSE's history.
The current Chief of CSE is D. Ian Glen (effective 12 July 1999). Under the Chief are six Directorates (SIGINT Production; Operations; Technology; INFOSEC; Policy and Plans; and Corporate Services), each headed by a Director-General. Each Directorate, in turn, contains a number of Groups, each headed by a Director. An approximation of CSE's overall organization is depicted in this organization chart.
The CSE budget appears to have weathered the end of the Cold War remarkably well. According to the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, CSE's 1990-91 budget was $105.1 million (or about $120 million in year 2000 dollars). If these figures can be taken at face value, it would appear that CSE's budget is now about 20 percent below its Cold War peak level. In fact, its budget almost certainly fared considerably better than these figures would indicate. 1990 was the peak year for CSE's spending on "Annie," the new wing of the Sir Leonard Tilley building completed in 1992. The extra funding added for this project may have boosted CSE's budget by as much as 15 percent over its normal level during that year. Excluding special projects such as this, CSE's budget may be only about 5 percent below its Cold War peak.
Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that CSE has faced real budgetary constraints since the end of the Cold War, the claim that CSE has suffered significant reductions appears to be a myth. Reallocations from capital and operations spending have enabled CSE to maintain a staff of 900 full-time equivalents (FTEs), essentially the same as it had in 1990-91 and 50 percent more than it had in 1980. Since progress in automation continues to reduce the number of staff in CSE's Communications Centre and other support areas, the number of analysts at CSE is actually likely to have increased since the end of the Cold War.
A unified collection
organization, the Supplementary
Radio System (SRS), was created in 1966 as part of the unification of
the Canadian Armed Forces. The mission of the CFIOG/SRS is:
"To operate and maintain Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and geolocation resources in support of the Canadian cryptologic programme;
"To operate and maintain Canadian Forces radio frequency direction finding facilities in support of Ocean surveillance, Search and Rescue and other programmes; and
"To provide Signals Intelligence, geolocation and Electronic Warfare support to Military Operations, including tactical SIGINT and Electronic Warfare (EW) support to commanders in the field."
As of the beginning of 1997, the strength of the SRS was reported to be 1025: 112 civilians (mainly support staff at the SIGINT stations) and 913 military personnel.[5] Approximately 785 of the latter were members of the Communicator Research (291) trade, i.e., the actual intercept operators. These numbers are down significantly from the beginning of the 1990s, a result of the end of the Cold War, the closing of the SRS intercept station at Bermuda, and the conversion of three other intercept stations - Alert, Gander, and Masset - to remote operations. Initial Communicator Research training takes place at CFB Kingston.
The Supplementary Radio System was renamed the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group on 1 April 1998. More information about the SRS/CFIOG can be found at the Online Oldtimers site.
Information Operations for Canada by Col J.D.R. Bourque contains a CFIOG organization chart.
Control over Canadian SIGINT activities is divided at the bureaucratic level, however, with policy and operational control exercised by the Deputy Secretary, Security and Intelligence, in the Privy Council Office, and administrative control exercised by the Deputy Minister of National Defence: "The [Deputy Secretary, Security and Intelligence, formerly the Security and Intelligence Coordinator] is accountable for CSE's policy and operations, and the Deputy Minister of National Defence is accountable for administrative matters affecting CSE."[8]
In exercising policy and operational control, the Deputy Secretary, Security and Intelligence works under the direction of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI) and, ultimately, the Minister of National Defence and Cabinet. "The ICSI maintains general policy control over all aspects of the collection, processing and dissemination of SIGINT..."[9] The Chief of CSE is an associate member of the ICSI.[10]
Among its other duties, the Privy Council Office "co-ordinates the Canadian SIGINT program with other national intelligence activities and formulates guidance, requirements and priorities for the provision of SIGINT product."[11] (Some user requirements are also provided to CSE bilaterally by SIGINT customer departments.)
Administrative control is exercised by the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence.
It is the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary, Security and Intelligence, "in co-operation with the deputy minister of National Defence, to ensure the Minister of National Defence [is] knowledgeable about matters of CSE, and able to respond to any questions that would be put on that subject."[12] In practice, however, it is likely that few ministers of National Defence ever obtain a detailed knowledge of the nature and activities of CSE. Former Minister of National Defence Jean-Jacques Blais has stated, for example, that "my knowledge of the Communications Security Establishment was very superficial indeed when I was minister of defence."[13]
It is almost certainly significant, however, that the government definition of "foreign" communications has never been made public; it was deleted in its entirety from the released version of IAC SIGINT Memorandum No. 1. Depending on the precise definition that the government uses, such communications might include:
It would appear, therefore, that CSE's "foreign intelligence" mandate does permit it to intercept many types of communications that do involve Canadian participants. In fact, the Department of National Defence has admitted that CSE occasionally intercepts communications that involve or contain information about Canadians: "CSE targets only foreign communications, which, on rare occasions, contain personal information about Canadian citizens and landed immigrants."[17] In addition, the government has confirmed that CSE maintains a data bank, DND/P-PU-040, "Communications Security Establishment Foreign Intelligence Files," that "contains personal information relating to sensitive aspects of Canada's international relations, security and defence." (An earlier version of the description stated more directly that the data bank contains "information concerning [Canadians] identified as potential risks to national security."[18])
CSE does have privacy policies to minimize inadvertent collection of Canadian communications and establish guidelines for the use or elimination of material that is collected. (The details of these policies, and the exceptions that they may or may not contain, have not been made public, however.) The CSE Commissioner, an independent overseer appointed in 1996, has confirmed that in his view CSE's privacy policies are respected. He also has stated that he is satisfied that "CSE has not targeted the communications of Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada." Several former CSE employees have alleged that abuses do occur, however.
See also the complete list of postwar Canadian SIGINT sites.
For obvious reasons, the identity of these new targets has not been revealed. It is almost certain, however, that many of them are located among the growing volume of civilian (non-governmental) traffic. Traffic carried on the communications satellites that serve Latin America is more likely to be the target of this expansion than Canadian traffic is, but any step towards the more systematic monitoring of civilian communications should be of concern. Who will be targeted next?
The Chretien government initially also maintained that CSE did not require independent oversight. To its credit, however, on 21 March 1995 it permitted the passage of a motion by MP Derek Lee calling on the government to "establish an independent external mechanism to review the operations of the Communications Security Establishment, CSE, similar to the role played by the Security Intelligence Review Committee for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and table a report annually in the House."[22] The following day, Defence Minister David Collenette announced that the government would indeed establish such a mechanism.[23]
Fifteen months later, on 19 June 1996, Collenette announced in the House of Commons that the government "has appointed Mr. Claude Bisson, former chief justice of Quebec, under part II of the Inquiries Act, as the first commissioner for the Communications Security Establishment. He will have full access to all materials, records and documentation. He will make an annual report to me as minister which I in turn will make to Parliament."[24] Mr. Bisson was appointed to a second three-year term on 15 June 1999.
The CSE Commissioner can be reached at:
Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner
P.O. Box 1984,
Station 'B',
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1P 5R5
The Commissioner's first annual report was released in April 1997. This report and subsequent reports can be found on the Commissioner's website. Each contains a variant of the following assurance: "I am of the opinion that CSE has acted lawfully in the performance of its mandated activities during the period under review. I am also satisfied that CSE has not targeted Canadian citizens or permanent residents."[25]
The creation of the Office of the CSE Commissioner is a strong step towards reassuring Canadians that their privacy is not being violated by CSE. In my view, however, a permanent oversight mechanism should have:
[2] For more information on Canada's wartime SIGINT activities, see John Bryden, Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War, Lester Publishing, 1993.
[3] History of CBNRC, Chapter 17, p. 2.
[4] Ward Elcock, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on National Security, 15 June 1993, p. 11:9; Statement by Margaret Bloodworth, Deputy Clerk, Security and Intelligence, to Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, 2 May 1995.
[5] CANADIAN FORCES SUPPLEMENTARY RADIO SYSTEM, Department of National Defence, 21 January 1997.
[6] On Course: National Security for the 1990s, Solicitor General, 1991, p. 54.
[7] On Course, p. 54.
[8] Report on Plans and Priorities 1998-99, Department of National Defence, 1998.
[9] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G.
[10] Ward Elcock, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act, 24 April 1990, p. 27:9.
[11] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G.
[12] Blair Seaborn, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act, 20 February 1990, p. 16:9.
[13] Quoted in Peter Moon, ``Spy agency left minister in dark,'' Globe and Mail, 3 June 1991, p. A4. Elsewhere Blais has commented that ``While I had responsibility for the estimates presented to Parliament, that responsibility did not extend to the exercise of ministerial control over the CSE. In practice the control was bureaucratic, in my view short-circuiting the principle of political accountability on which our democracy is founded.'' (Jean Jacques Blais, ``Committee should be expanded to review other agencies,'' Ottawa Citizen, 2 July 1992, p. A11.)
[14] History of CBNRC, Chapter 2, Annex G
[15] See, e.g., Minister of State (External Relations) Jean-Luc Pepin, testimony, Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 22 September 1983, p. 19.
[16] Robert Kaplan, testimony, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, 5 April 1984, p. 11:68.
[17] Letter from Commander F.B. Frewer, Director Public Affairs Operations, National Defence, to Peter Moon, 15 April 1991.
[18] Personal Information Index 1988, 1988, p. 47- 3.
[19] In Flux But Not in Crisis, report of the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act, September 1990, pp. 152-3; Annual Report 1988-89, Security Intelligence Review Committee, 1989.
[20] On Course, p. 55.
[21] There is little reason to expect that CSE has been any more reliable in this respect. See, for example, the allegations in the book Spyworld (Mike Frost and Michel Gratton, Spyworld: Inside the Canadian and American Intelligence Establishments, Doubleday Canada, 1994) concerning the interception of Quebec government communications. In 1991, ``former CSE employees and other sources,'' told the Globe and Mail that ``in the past the agency routinely broke Canadian laws in the collection of intelligence involving Canadians.'' (Peter Moon, ``Secrecy shrouds spy agency,'' Globe and Mail, 27 May 1991, pp. A1, A4.) This allegation has not been proven, but a disquieting example of CSE failing to follow appropriate procedures and respect the rights of one of its own employees is on the public record in Muriel Korngold Wexler, Record of Decision (file 166-13-17850), Public Service Staff Relations Board, 12 March 1990. This document includes a detailed description of the mistreatment and eventual unjust firing of CSE cryptanalyst Edwina Slattery during the 1980s. It should be noted that Ms. Slattery considers the Record of Decision's description of the events surrounding her firing to be inaccurate in many respects, notwithstanding the fact that it supported her claim that she had been unjustly fired and recommended that she receive compensation equivalent to two years' pay. Ms. Slattery eventually took the case to the Federal Court of Canada and continues to pursue it in other ways.
[22] House of Commons Debates, 21 March 1995, pp. 10815-10820.
[23] Tu Thanh Ha, ``Secretive agency to be more open, Collenette says,'' Globe and Mail, 23 March 1995, p. A5.
[24] House of Commons Debates, 19 June 1996.
[25] Annual Report of the Communications Establishment Commissioner 1996-1997, Office of the Communications Establishment Commissioner, 1997, p. 10.
© 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, Bill Robinson.
