

9/11 AND THE CANADIAN SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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There has been a tendency to view 9/11 as an epochal event. It is doubtful that even in the US, the world was irrevocably changed, that 'nothing will ever be the same again', as the media refrain has relentlessly reiterated. Pearl Harbor brought an abrupt end to isolationism in America, but the interventionist forces that were unleashed in 1941 were not conjured up out of nothing by the Japanese attackers. They were there already, awaiting only the discrediting of their isolationist opposition. 9/11 accelerated some changes already in process and blocked or inhibited other trends that now seemed less convincing in light of the terrorist attacks.

The further we move from Ground Zero and from the United States itself, the less straightforward the impact of 9/11 appears. Canada is closer than any other country, both geographically and culturally, to the US. Here, the reverberations of 9/11 were powerful indeed, but Canada did not feel the impact in exactly the same way as the US did. The shock waves were absorbed in Canada differently, sometimes subtly, sometimes not so subtly. The impact of 9/11 on the US has been above all in terms of apprehending the imminence of the terrorist threat and finding ways to defeat it. 9/11 was an attack on the US, on its military and economic symbols, and on American civil society. Canadians sympathized with Americans, shared their pain, and joined in their anger. Canadians recognized the need to bolster their security and expand intelligence on terrorism, both to assist a friend, and to help themselves.

Canadians also realize that they are not a *primary* target of Al Qaida. The attack on the WTC and the Pentagon sent a clear message, however perverse, about American economic and military power. An attack on the CN Tower and Ottawa Defence HQ would send an indecipherable message. This does not rule out terrorism as a threat on Canadian soil, but it does reduce its urgency. When the US went on Code Orange on the anniversary of 9/11, Canada opted not to follow.

9/11 brought with it another kind of threat to Canada: collateral damage to Canadian economic security as a result of American national security concerns applied to the Canada-US border. Canada faced the loss of sovereignty attendant upon measures required to assure Americans that the everyday flow of goods, services, capital, and people across America's northern frontier did not constitute a US national security risk. Some loss of sovereignty was inevitable, and has occurred. There were, however, schemes for a sweeping 'perimeter security' framework, or a Fortress North America – proposed both by the US (US ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci) and by influential and powerful forces within Canada – that might have entailed high potential loss of Canadian sovereignty. At the same time as the government of Canada responded to 9/11 with measures to counter the terrorist threat, which I will describe in a moment, it was also forced to conduct a difficult series of negotiations with the US restructuring some key aspects of the Canada-US relationship. It has, I believe, conducted these negotiations skillfully and adroitly, reassuring the Americans and restoring the flow of commerce with the

minimum loss of sovereignty possible under the circumstances. I will discuss these negotiations in greater detail later, but for now it is important to understand that 9/11 forced Canada onto parallel tracks of adjustment, one track being the terrorist threat, the other collateral damage to Canada caused by the American response to 9/11. The first has been visible and only moderately controversial, the second less visible, yet at the same time highly controversial and indeed even divisive within Canada.

This two-track complexity has been compounded, especially in the past few months, by yet another spinoff of 9/11 that is felt very differently indeed by Americans and by their allies. The confident, even aggressive, assertion of US unilateralism, evident first in the series of rejections or repudiations of multilateral agreements, and now in the redirection of the war in terrorism to a war on Iraq, and articulated in two recent texts – Bush’s speech to the UN, and the National Security Strategy (the Bush Doctrine) – not only questions the ‘coalition’ status of the war on terrorism, but directly challenges key elements of Canadian foreign policy, including multilateralism, the international rule of law, collective security under UN auspices, and the human security agenda. This assertion of American exceptionalism on a global scale will cause considerable strains in the Canadian-American relationship and in the fabric of domestic politics in Canada. It also, I will argue in conclusion, undermines the viability of the war on terrorism itself.

This then is the relatively complex field on which the response of the Canadian security and intelligence community to 9/11 should be assessed. To Canada, this war is on more than one front. Moreover, we have to carefully distinguish between what is genuinely new and linked to the impact of 9/11 as an exogenous event, and what was already in process prior to 9/11, but required unblocking.

THE DIRECT IMPACT OF 9/11:

There is no doubt that 9/11 had an immediate and serious impact on the policy agenda of the Canadian government. It is rare, although not unknown, for external events to bring about a serious realignment of national priorities. The ill-fated National Energy Program of the early 1980s was an earlier example of the domestic impact of an external event (the energy crisis). 9/11 in some ways resembled more the impact of the declaration of war in 1939, although at a much lower level of intensity. We can summarize the impact under the following headings:

- [1] restructuring of cabinet architecture for policy making
- [2] reallocating budgetary resources
- [3] military contributions to the war on terrorism
- [4] new or expanded legislative powers
- [5] restructuring of bureaucratic mechanisms
- [6] negotiating border security arrangements

THE CABINET COMMITTEE

The striking of the ad hoc cabinet committee on national security was a key step. It symbolized a degree of high-level attention to security matters that had hitherto been dangerously low. There had once been a cabinet committee on security and intelligence, chaired by the prime minister. Under pressure of a grave security crisis, the October 1970 FLQ kidnapping and assassination affair, this committee had exhibited a brief life that extended into the 1970s with a prime ministerial insistence on countering the separatist movement in Quebec.

Scandals that subsequently engulfed the RCMP security service and led to its civilianization in the 1980s sharply reduced the appetite of the cabinet for getting its hands dirty in the business of 'political policing'. By the time of the Mulroney Conservative governments from 1984 to 1993, this committee rarely met and apparently decided very little. Mulroney's Conservative successor simply abolished the committee as part of a retrenchment of cabinet operations, and Mr Chrétien did not see fit to revive it upon assuming office. Thus security and intelligence did not have any institutionalized cabinet-level representation. The co-coordinating machinery housed in the PCO had no cabinet-level point of entry, which could be considered a serious deficiency, especially in the Canadian variant of the parliamentary system where the PM and the cabinet are so dominant and largely unchecked.

The ad hoc committee would seem to have dramatically reversed this neglect of security and intelligence. It was set up in a crisis atmosphere of some considerable urgency. It comprises all the key cabinet players with departments and agencies with roles in security (although curiously omitting then Health minister Allan Rock, whose handling of the anthrax scare was thus outside the committee's direct attention). For a time it functioned as a virtual inner, or war, cabinet, while new policy guidelines were being devised and enacted – although this no longer appears to be the case. Most importantly of all, perhaps, it is chaired by John Manley, who within the past year has spanned the key cabinet posts of foreign affairs, deputy PM, and now finance minister, as well as carrying under his wing a number of ad hoc policy areas of particular political interest to the Chrétien government. Mr Manley quickly parlayed this post into a base for establishing his reputation as the strong man of the cabinet, rivaling Paul Martin while the latter remained, and now succeeding him following his sacking. It could thus be said that security and intelligence not only had cabinet representation, but very strong cabinet representation to boot. This was a clear demonstration that the government was not merely reacting to 9/11 with symbolic agenda readjustment, but was serious about materially restructuring government priorities toward privileging security concerns.

It might be noted parenthetically that this exercise indicates a greater potential flexibility and adaptability in the machinery of government than may be the case in the US congressional system. Even though 9/11 had much more direct and traumatic impact on the US than on Canada, the bumpy and twisting path in the US through homeland security 'czar' Tom Ridge through the as-yet unachieved congressional approval for the massive reorganization of government operations into the proposed Homeland Security Department, suggest, theoretically at least, a greater suppleness and rapid response time in the Canadian system to meeting sudden external challenges.

BUDGETARY REALLOCATION

Cabinet's intentions were given some flesh with Paul Martin's post-9/11 (and last) budget. \$7.7 billion of new resources was allocated over the next five years to security and enforcement. CSIS, the RCMP, the CSE, Immigration, and Customs Canada, will get the bulk of these new resources. Critics suggest this is too little, too late, that these resources will be insufficient to meet the challenge of terrorism, or even to satisfy the US that Canada is adequately maintaining its part in the security of North America. I do not claim competence in evaluating these claims, which are after all, dependent upon threat assessments that are themselves inherently problematic, if not controversial, especially in the absence of secret intelligence. I would make two, related points. First, this figure does represent a significant shift in the priorities of the government of Canada,

made all the more striking by the absence of any previous indication in the Liberal government's political program of any intention to upgrade significantly national security. Second, this is a government that, with or without Mr Martin, has a powerful overriding commitment to fiscal responsibility and maintaining current government accounts in the black. Competing claims for expenditure came, and continue to come, from the 'social' Liberal side of the party, particularly around the issues of healthcare and programs supporting children and families, or from 'green' Liberals looking for environmental protection, such as implementation of the Kyoto accord. This sweeping reallocation to security, which had only weak political representation in the Liberal party, does indicate the powerful impact of 9/11, either directly or via the perceived indirect impact through new US actions harmful to Canadian economic security. Either way, 9/11 did have immediate and dramatic consequences for how the Canadian government does business.

There is one striking omission from the new resources devoted to security. A mere pittance is devoted to the military. This omission is all the more striking in light of repeated assertions from many quarters, including the Commons defence committee, defence scholars, and numerous think tanks and public interest groups, that very substantial infusions of cash into the Canadian forces are necessary to ward off serious decline and incapacity. Given the broad range of tasks that the Chrétien government has set the military, from peacekeeping to collective security to domestic emergencies, its repeated failure to provide adequate resources to fulfill these tasks is certainly questionable, at the very least, if not evidence of dereliction of responsibility.

MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

In responding to president Bush's call for a coalition to fight a war on terrorism, Canada sent naval, ground, and special forces to Afghanistan. This decision was, and continues to be, supported by Canadian public opinion, and by a multiparty consensus in Parliament – even following the unfortunate incident in which four Canadians were killed by US-directed 'friendly fire'. It was in keeping with a long Canadian tradition of supporting actions in the name of collective security, including Korea, the Gulf, and Kosovo. In military terms, the Canadian contribution can hardly be termed substantial, but symbolically it did indicate Canadian support for the initial stages of the war on terrorism, the overthrow of the Taliban regime as providing a land base and staging ground for Al Qaida. And it further signaled, along with other indicators, that the Canadian security and intelligence community, including its cash-starved defence intelligence establishment, was being directed to integrate its efforts into the coalition.

Canada's decision to recall its ground forces early from Afghanistan is a sign that the deterioration caused by chronic underfunding is becoming quite visible. Military incapacity may also mask to a degree the breakdown of consensus in the coalition that has followed military victory in Afghanistan. Canada may not be able to provide even symbolic support for a war on Iraq, even one sanctioned by a Security Council resolution. Whether this will be as a result of political objections, or simply penury, may appear as a moot question.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS

In the immediate wake of 9/11, Canada showed that it could expedite the legislative process under the pressure of events. Although it did not quite match the enthusiasm of the congressional stampede to enact the USA PATRIOT Act, the government quickly prepared a sweeping and comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Act (C-36), and guided it through public

consultation and parliamentary debate and into royal assent at a relatively brisk pace, considering the controversial nature of some of its provisions.

What had originally been billed as a companion piece, the Public Safety Act, has had a more checkered career. Mainly concerned with air safety, biochemical weapons control, and Defence computer security, this legislation contained a highly controversial provision for the creation of military security zones. One small part of the bill was enacted separately under the gun of an impending deadline in the US on security requirements for aircraft flying in the US. The full bill was then withdrawn, redrafted in part to reflect criticisms, especially those of Liberal backbench MPs, and resubmitted as C-56, It subsequently died when the prime minister prorogued Parliament and will have to be introduced once again in the fall session – if the government is still behind it. The fading impetus on the Public Safety Act does seem to suggest declining government commitment as 9/11 recedes further into the past.

C-36 will stand for now as the main legislative response to 9/11. It is sweeping and comprehensive, an omnibus act on national security. On closer perusal, and despite the obsessive focus of most public debate and criticism, emergency anti-terrorist provisions occasioned by 9/11 actually constitute a relatively small part of the act. Those sections that might be linked directly to 9/11 can be limited to the following:

- [1] legal definition of terrorism
- [2] the official listing of terrorist entities
- [3] specific terrorist funding offences
- [4] preventive detention
- [5] investigative hearings

The emergency character of the last two innovations was recognized by the government when it attached sunset clauses at the insistence of critics. Given the furor these occasioned in civil liberties and multicultural circles, it is interesting that neither appears to have actually been yet used by the government. Whether they will ever be used is an open question. Perhaps, despite the fears of critics, these devices were never seriously intended to be used, except perhaps in the event of another 9/11, this time directly touching on Canada. Their importance may always have been more symbolic than real. With regard to item [3]: having established the controversial idea of an official proscription list of terrorist entities subject to the criminal code, government laboured for months, and finally in late July of 2002 produced a list of seven entities – a shorter list than the equivalents in the US and Europe. There were controversies about the absences from the list, especially Hezbollah, which Canada refused to proscribe. Again, the Canadian attitude seemed to be: arm yourself with a big stick, but wield it sparingly, if at all.

Despite its misleading name, I would argue that The Anti-terrorism Act is actually a proto-National Security Act, most of the provisions of which were in the pipeline in Ottawa for some time, many strongly favoured by elements within the security and intelligence community, but stalled by the lack of attention paid to security and intelligence issues in pre-9/11 Ottawa. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it almost appears as if relevant agencies were circularized to submit their wish lists, many of which were then incorporated into the omnibus 'anti-terrorist' bill.

Among the non-9/11 related elements of C-36:

- The Official Secrets Act is replaced by the Security of Information Act, including new offences, such as economic espionage
- The CSE is given a statutory mandate, with its powers and limitations spelled out, and with an important additional power to retain Canadian communications related to terrorism
- The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering Act) is amended to include terrorism as well as organized crime as its primary objects
- Serious limitations are imposed on the Access to Information, Privacy, and Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Acts with regard to disclosure and retention of information relating to national security
- Provisions regarding non-disclosure of evidence serve mainly to 'Charter-proof' existing evidence provisions following the Stinchcombe decision of the Supreme Court.

Taken together with the CSIS and Security Offences Act of 1984 (the latter now augmented by C-12-(the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act) passed just prior to 9/11, C-36 constitutes the basis for a Canadian national security act. Unfortunately, although the opportunity offered by 9/11 was alertly seized by the security and intelligence community, which has ended up with much more than it would likely have achieved had 9/11 not happened, the atmosphere surrounding C-36's passage precluded an intelligent national debate on the merits of the specific elements of C-36 that were not directly related to 9/11. Thus the passage of the successor to the discredited and ineffective Official Secrets Act has not been accompanied by any external debate that might have illuminated its strengths and weaknesses –not a healthy way for such matters to be dealt with in a democracy, and not perhaps in the long term interest of the security and intelligence community, which requires informed public interest and support.

BUREAUCRATIC RESTRUCTURING

There are some new players in the Ottawa security and intelligence community. FinTrac, located in the Finance Department, plays an important role in tracking and identifying money laundering trails. The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, which has an excellent director in Margaret Purdy and the worst acronym in the Ottawa galaxy, has a crucial role in what the Americans call homeland security. But FinTrac and OCIEPP pre-date 9/11, even if their roles have been boosted by the terrorist threat.

The most significant effects of 9/11 on the bureaucratic structuring of the security and intelligence community perhaps lie in the category of the dogs that didn't bark. The first is the long debated issue of a central foreign intelligence agency for Canada. This debate had always been an academic one, even when it was practitioners, or recently retired practitioners, who were debating, since there was never the slightest indication of any interest on the part of successive governments in such a project. Following 9/11, no less than John Manley, chair of the cabinet committee, publicly mused about the need for such an agency as

a real option. There apparently followed an internal interdepartmental debate around this idea – a debate sketchily and not altogether convincingly reported – which, in the nature of such bureaucratic debates, appears to have fallen into a contest over turf. In this contest, the most effective turf defender seems to have been CSIS, arguing that it already had authority to collect foreign intelligence related to threats to the security of Canada. Director Ward Elcock raised a rather expansive version of this interpretation when he assured a senate committee that CSIS had a mandate exactly like that of the CIA. More modestly put, CSIS still had a strong case when the major foreign intelligence interest appears to be terrorism. Indeed, CSIS, which has in recent years been doing more foreign intelligence collection than in the past, appears to be the main beneficiary of any renewed interest in foreign intelligence. It is now definitive: no new agency will be created, but CSIS will beef up its foreign dimension. This solution may appeal to cost-conscious and conflict-averse Ottawa, but it does not answer to the main concern raised by proponents of a stand-alone agency: the need for broad, strategic intelligence input into Canadian foreign policy. If 9/11 re-stimulated the foreign intelligence debate, its focus on terrorism undermined the much broader intentions of those who advocate a new agency.

The other dog that never barked is a central bureaucratic mechanism linking the community to the cabinet decision makers, a British-style Joint Intelligence Committee, or an Australian-style Office of National Assessments. Although the PCO Intelligence Assessment Branch has been somewhat beefed up in terms of resources, it has not passed the threshold into JIC or ONA status. I suspect that the window of opportunity offered by 9/11 and by the Manley committee has already closed on this set of options. The security and intelligence community may thus remain somewhat fragmented, unfocussed, and relatively weak in its capacity to provide an integrated intelligence product to cabinet.

BORDER SECURITY

Although sold as a response to 9/11 terrorism, negotiations on improved border security are actually more an indirect response to 9/11, mediated through the frame of the US threat to Canadian economic security. Obviously, Canadians want and expect their government to secure their borders from terrorists. Government has at least an equal stake in ensuring that no terrorist enters the US via Canada to wreak havoc in the American homeland. We owe this to our ally and close friend, but just as urgent from the Canadian perspective is the requirement to head off American security protectionism that constitutes a direct dollar cost to Canadian business and Canadian jobs. There never was a Canadian Connection of any significance to 9/11, a fact now publicly acknowledged by the US government, but not by many American politicians and media outlets. Even the notorious pre-9/11 case of Ahmed Ressam, however exploited by certain serial confessors in this country unaccountably eager to blame Canada for every American security lapse, has now been put to partial rest by US Attorney General John Ashcroft (hardly a bleeding-heart liberal in such

matters) who publicly acknowledged that US authorities were alerted to Ressam by a tip from Canadian authorities. Despite misperceptions on both sides of the border, Canada has never been a 'Club Med for terrorists'. In fact, Canadian standards for identifying the bad guys are pretty much the same as the US criteria. After all, the two countries share a similar data base on such matters. Canadian rules for dealing with terrorist suspects are not in fact notably laxer or more liberal than those in use in the US. Indeed, in the specific matter of the non-disclosure of sensitive intelligence in court, Canadian rules are actually stiffer than American. If there was a gap between Canada and the US in immigration security, it was an *enforcement* gap, attributable to relatively fewer resources available on the Canadian side. This had already begun to change post-Ressam and pre-9/11, and the gap is now being narrowed in the wake of the last Martin budget. Whether new resources are adequate is a different question than that addressed by the political and journalistic critics of Canadian performance, who have impugned the objectives and standards of Canadian policy. In my view, they have been barking up the wrong tree.

The incontrovertible fact for Canada remains that the US is entirely serious about enforcing its standards for security at all entry points to the US. Either these standards will be enforced at the Canada-US border, or they will be enforced around the North American perimeter. The former case imposes unacceptable costs on the Canadian economy, not to speak of civil society. The latter is the only viable and acceptable response, but it might under certain circumstances come at a serious cost to Canadian sovereignty. Harmonization of immigration policy, however shiny the gloss put upon it, plainly means Canadian acceptance of US standards. Expansive perimeter security schemes, along European lines (common labour market, common entry policy), would not only entail serious costs to Canadian sovereignty (especially at a moment when the US is in an America First, no infringement on US sovereignty mood), but would probably not fly for American political reasons: Canada and the US could not form a privileged inner core of NAFTA to the exclusion of the Mexicans, but free entry of Mexican labour into the US would be unacceptable to Americans. Despite insistent pressures from influential voices within Canada, the Liberal government has avoided falling into any of the proffered 'big ideas' of comprehensive integration. Instead Canada has pursued a strategy of thinking small, negotiating incremental changes that cumulatively have the effect of reassuring legitimate American security concerns without trading away any more sovereignty than is necessary under the circumstances.

The Smart Border negotiations between Manley and Ridge have been successful from the Canadian perspective. Key elements of this process involve the application of technology to fast track goods and low-risk people while focusing attention on higher risks. Pre-clearance of goods destined for the US is a workable example of the original, pre-9/11, concept of perimeter security, which was emphatically *not* Fortress North America, but rather the notion of identifying and interdicting threats wherever they appear before they arrive at the border. Indeed, via the G-8, the Canadian-US agreement on pre-clearance is now

a template being applied in Europe and elsewhere. On the movement of people, a 'safe third country' agreement for asylum seekers between Canada and the US (already on the Canadian books, but not negotiated) will reduce apprehensions in the US about security risks entering the US via Canada. More remains to be negotiated in this area, but the broad outlines of a settlement are clear. American national security concerns are being met, as are Canadian economic security concerns, but at minimal cost to Canadian sovereignty. For instance, Canada has so far successfully resisted adopting the American (and British) practice of indefinite detention of non-citizens on suspicion, often without legal counsel. This is contrary to Canadian values, and to the judicial interpretation of the Charter of Rights. Canada does detain non-citizens, but for justiciable cause. This is an example of distinctive Canadian practice that in my view should be maintained, and can be, in the context of incremental negotiations that place reasonable limits on harmonization of policy.

In summary, taking all the elements of response to 9/11 together, we see a Canadian government that acted with relative decisiveness in resetting national priorities and restructuring government security policy. 9/11 appears less as an exogenous variable than as an external event that facilitated certain processes already in train. Canada has modulated its direct response to 9/11 more than its US ally, which is neither surprising nor inappropriate considering its more peripheral status as a target for terrorism. 9/11 has been mediated for Canada through the lens of the Canadian-American relationship, which has necessitated Canada managing a kind of two-front war, with the US against the terrorist enemy, while at the same time struggling to limit the collateral damage to Canada threatened, more inadvertently than intentionally, by our ally and friend.

The Canadian security and intelligence community has benefited from 9/11 in the sense of gaining more resources, more prestige, and perhaps – although this remains to be seen – more influence on policy. The defence community has however been a loser in the process, with consequences for the Canadian position that may be serious indeed. This latter is the Achilles Heel of Liberal policy.

AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND STRAINS ON THE COALITION

I have argued that Canada has been relatively successful in managing this curious two-front war, offensive against our enemy, and defensive against our ally. However, the turn of the Bush administration toward unilateralism, which preceded 9/11, was briefly obscured during the coalition-building period in the fall of 2001, but has now emerged fully with the refocusing of the war on terrorism from bin Laden to Saddam Hussein and regime-change in Iraq, and the articulation of the Bush Doctrine, poses far heavier challenges to alliance solidarity. The Bush administration idea of coalition is, to understate it, somewhat idiosyncratic. As Donald Rumsfeld recently put it to the *New York Times*: 'Because it is impossible to guard against terrorist attack in every place and at every time, self-defense requires pre-emption, taking the battle to the terrorists and to those states that support them. That, according to Mr. Rumsfeld,

requires a more flexible way of building coalitions, seeking allies but refusing to allow pressure from them to restrict American action.’ This is a one-way idea of coalition, one described in a nutshell as ‘take dictation’.

Canada has already learned to its regret that singing on to Bush’s war on terrorism did not bring any reciprocal benefits, such as attention on the part of the US to outstanding grievances in Canadian-American relations. One can cite the destructive effects of punitive measures against the Canadian forest industry by the protectionist US softwood lumber lobby, and the failure of the White House to intervene even after a direct appeal from the prime minister. Real coalitions are matters of negotiation, give and take. The Bush doctrine of coalition is from the US perspective, all take and no give. From the ‘partner’s’ perspective, there is no *quid* for the *quo*. This arrangement may satisfy Tony Blair, but not too many more allies, including Canada.

These worrying trends culminate in the US insistence on going it alone if necessary to effect régime change in Iraq, and the assertion of a right to pre-emptive action anywhere in the world, on criteria set by the US alone, if necessary. These are not positions acceptable to long standing principles of Canadian foreign policy. But the relentless focus on Iraq and Saddam Hussein signals something else which is, or ought to be, deeply worrying not just to the government of Canada but to the security and intelligence community itself. The war on terrorism was originally set in the context of the new realities of the 21st century: a world of borderless threats, of networks, criminal or terrorist, operating on a global scale, challenging the old, territorially-rooted nation state. Restoring global order to this new Hobbesian state of nature would require a multilateral Leviathan, an unprecedented multinational alliance to bring borderless regulation to a borderless threat environment. Certainly the US, as the sole remaining superpower and the pre-eminent, unchallenged, military power, would be required to take a leadership position. But no state, not even the US, can act as a stand-alone entity. The new reality of globalized threats demands multilateral responses.

Within one year, the Bush administration has squandered much of the goodwill, sympathy, and sense of solidarity that 9/11 precipitated. By asserting a unilateral right of American preemption, and by insisting that Americans must be above the rule of international law that applies to everyone else (the rejection of the International Court of Criminal Justice), America presents itself to much of the world as itself a threat, rather than a support against threats. And by fixating on Iraq, on the bad guy whose address we know, as opposed to bin Laden whom we can’t find, and on a supposed ‘Axis of Evil’ of disparate nations who have few if any connections between them, Bush has deflected attention from the difficult and demanding job of countering the borderless networks of terrorists, and set up an old-fashioned state v. state scenario – in which the bad states are both advertised as fiendishly dangerous, and treated as potential pushovers for quick military victories. The naked national self-interest of the US in controlling Iraqi oil and further advancing the position of US interests in the

Gulf will scarcely escape the notice of the rest of the world, however much the venture is clothed in the self-serving and patronizing rhetoric of American stewardship.

The implication of these developments for the Canadian security and intelligence community are ominous. 9/11 has provided expanded resources, and at the same time promoted yet closer integration with the US. As the Bush administration continues down the path of unilateralism, preemption, and a globalized America Firstism – what might be called the Frank Sinatra school of international relations: ‘I did it my way’ – the more that the strains this imposes on allies, and especially Canada, caught by geography and history, will impose stress on the security and intelligence community, as it juggles the contradictory pressures of its aggressive American partners and the increasing qualms and misgivings of its Canadian political masters, and of the Canadian public behind them.